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INTRODUCTION

Is it possible to decide whether a constitutional decision is right
or wrong? Legal scholars respond with an enthusiastic 'Yes!" but their
reasons for this answer are generally based on what philosophers call
formal arguments. 1 These arguments, as opposed to substantive
arguments, focus on internal coherence, rather than external
standards. Originalism, textualism, structural analysis, and evolving
meaning are all formal arguments. 2 Their appeal lies precisely in their
*
1.
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formalizing arguments).
2.
For a useful
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taxonomy

of such arguments,

1-3 (2012)

see

(discussing the art of

generally

PHILLIP BOBBITT,

CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982). Bobbitt's categories of argument

are historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural, and ethical. Id. at 7-8. Textual,
doctrinal, and structural arguments are undoubtedly formal; historical argument is based to an
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independence from external issues-that is, from the sort of issues
that generate political and social controversy. If one can demonstrate
by formal argument that a particular constitutional decision is correct,
then one can insist on the result, even in the face of those who
disagree on normative or pragmatic grounds.
Erwin Chemerinsky's The Case Against the Supreme Court
takes a different approach.3 It condemns the Court's decisions, over
the course of American history, on the grounds that these decisions
have violated an external standard. That standard can be roughly
described as a progressive approach to human rights issues. At the
outset, Chemerinsky states that his standard for "assessing whether
the Court is succeeding or failing" is whether it hands down decisions
"that are uniformly condemned by subsequent generations of scholars
and judges." 4 Such decisions could involve a wide variety of topics, of
course, but Chemerinsky goes on to declare that the ones on which he
is basing his assessment-and the ones we should care about-are
"the rights of minorities who cannot rely on the political process" and
resistance to "repressive desires of political majorities."5
The formal standards, such as fidelity to text or structural
coherence, that dominate academic writing about constitutional law
are subject to many challenges, but Chemerinsky's external standard
is equally open to challenge, albeit on different grounds. Viewed as a
philosophical or ethical standard, it depends on the consensus
approach to truth, 6 as opposed to a correspondence theory (aligning
with either textualism or original intent) or a coherence theory
(aligning with structuralism or doctrinalism). 7 Viewed as a social
norm, it can be accused of what Herbert Butterfield described as the

external factor, but can also be considered formal because it involves the meaning embedded in
the text. Pragmatic and ethical arguments are substantive. They are certainly identified in
academic discourse, but usually not accepted as independent determination of constitutional
meaning. For example, it is common for the Justices or commentators to insist that the meaning
of the Constitution cannot be based on practical considerations of convenience, a position
typically identified as formalism. The opposing argument, often called functionalism, is not that
such considerations should control by themselves, but rather that they represent a preferable
interpretation of the text.
3.

See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT (2014).

4.
5.
6.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 10.
Also described as a relativist approach.

See generally STEVEN LUKEs, MORAL

RELATISM (2008); J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1980); DAVID WONG,

MORAL RELATIVITY (1984).
7.

See SIMON BLACKBURN, TRUTH: A GUIDE 56-58 (2005); RICHARD L. KIRKHAM, THEORIES

OF TRUTH: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 104-12, 119-40 (1992); HILARY PUTNAM, REALISM WITH A
HUMAN FACE 18-29 (1990); DONALD DAVIDSON, On The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in
THE ESSENTIAL DAVIDSON 196-209 (2006).
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Whig interpretation of history.8 It is an interpretation that "studies
the past with reference to the present . . . [so that] historical
personages can easily . . . be classed into the men who furthered
progress and the men who tried to hinder it .... The total result of
this method is to impose a certain form upon the whole historical
story."9 Butterfield's critique is implicit in his description; we deploy
our present consensus, itself unjustifiable, to impose unjustifiable
praise or condemnation upon people in the past who lived in different
worlds and could not have possibly imagined the one from which those
judgments emanate.
This Article explores the approach to constitutional judgment
that underlies Chemerinsky's book. Its basic approach is to
contextualize these decisions in three different ways. The first, which
can be described as a conceptual contextualization, is to place the
decision in the mental framework that prevailed at the time the
decision was made. In areas that develop cumulatively, the point is
obvious; medieval physicians who tried to cure patients by bloodletting
were neither incompetent nor cruel; James Clerk Maxwell's work
cannot be faulted because he thought electro-magnetic waves
propagated through the aether. But the point applies as well to
normative positions that change over time. As Butterfield argues, the
validity of imposing contemporary standards on past actors is
questionable. The resulting judgments tend to be simultaneously too
harsh and too lenient-too harsh because it tends to condemn
everyone who lived more than a few decades ago, and too lenient
because such global condemnation provides the protection of a crowd
for those who should have known better at the time.
The second form of contextualization is pragmatic. Real-world
decision-makers necessarily function in political, economic, and social
settings, and those settings both empower and constrain them. It is
one thing to expect people to carry out their roles with energy,
imagination, and courage, but quite another thing to expect them to
act outside those roles, and still another to insist on truly heroic or
transformative behavior. Perhaps we will want to condemn people
who did not speak out about the injustices of a totalitarian regime like
the Soviet Union under Stalin, but the judgment will seem superficial
and naive if we do not take account of the costs that such speech
would incur. 10 The extent of the demands we place on prior actors, and

8.

HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 3-6 (1965).

9.
Id. at 11.
10. The well-known anecdote, probably apocryphal, is that Khrushchev was giving a speech
during the de-Stalinization movement and someone shouted, "Why didn't you challenge [Stalin]
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the judgments that we make about their actions, necessarily depends
on our attitudes about the pragmatic content within which they
functioned, and realistic demands depend on an understanding of that
context.
The third form of contextualization can be described as
institutional. It takes into account not only the conceptual framework
of the time when the decision was made and the pragmatic demands
on the decision maker, but also the type of decision maker that is
being judged. Individuals often act at a specific time and can be judged
on the basis of that action. But institutions exist over time, and often
maintain their relative position in society for the duration. A further
contextualization of their actions, therefore, is to consider the
institution's performance over time. This does not necessarily mean
that one is being more lenient toward an institution. Rather, it only
means that one recognizes its essential modality of action.
This Article will consider each of these forms of
contextualization in succession. It will focus on the case with which
Chemerinsky begins, Buck v. Bell," a case in which the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a law that permitted a state to
sterilize certain classes of people against their will.
I. NORMATIVE CONTEXTUALIZATION
A. The SterilizationDebate
The Court's decision in Buck v. Bell clearly satisfies
Chemerinsky's principal criterion for badness; it reaches a result that
is "uniformly condemned by subsequent generations of scholars and
judges." Although it comes from the now-disparaged Lochner Era, it
cannot be ascribed to the conservative Four Horsemen 12 because it

then, the way you are now?" When Khrushchev asked who had spoken, the room was silent.
"Now you know ... why I did not speak up against Stalin when I sat where you now sit," he
responded. Comment to Topic: Nikita Kruschev Anecdote, SNOPES.COM (Jan. 11, 2005, 12:29 PM),
http://msgboard.snopes.com/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get-topic;f=96;t=000852;p=0
[https://perma.cc/CM64-4XAB].

11.

274 U.S. 200 (1927).

12. The Lochner Era takes its name from the Court's decision in Lochner v. New York, a
seminal substantive due process decision invalidating a state maximum hours law. 198 U.S. 45
(1905). The Four Horsemen were Justices Pierce Butler (served 1923-39), James Clark
McReynolds (1914-41), George Sutherland (1922-38) and Willis Van Devanter (1910-37). None
were on the Court when Lochner was decided, but they agreed with its analysis and deployed it
against New Deal legislation, and all were serving when Buck v. Bell was decided in 1927. For a
discussion of their influence, see generally BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT:
THE STRUCTURE OF A CONsTITuTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998).
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was authored by Justice Holmes and was decided 8-1.13 Moreover,
Holmes' unsurpassed ability to write memorable epigrams betrayed
him in this instance. His declaration that "[t]hree generations of
imbeciles are enough" 14 remains an undying example of slovenly
record-reading and elite insensitivity that blots his otherwise sterling
reputation.
But does this judgment merely represent the questionable
practice of imposing current values on the past, as Butterfield noted?
Compelled sterilization of the unfit was a central policy of the
eugenics movement that flourished during the first third of the
twentieth century, particularly in the United States. 15 Eugenics was
strongly championed by leading scientists; the First International
Eugenics Conference, held in London in 1912, was attended by
Leonard Darwin (Charles's son), Alexander Graham Bell, and a
number of others who were well-known at the time and possessed
impeccable academic qualifications. 16 Their efforts quickly garnered
the support of some of the most prestigious private funding
institutions and individual philanthropists in the nation, including the
Carnegie Institution, the Rockefeller Foundation, Mary Harriman,
John Harvey Kellogg, and John D. Rockefeller, Jr.' 7 Many leading
social reformers, including Margaret Sanger, the tireless advocate for
legalizing contraception,18 were in favor, as were Theodore Roosevelt
and Woodrow Wilson. 19 The theory drew on a long tradition of
pragmatic research on plant and animal breeding whose value is
unquestioned to this day, and added the most up-to-date insights from
Darwinian evolution and Mendelian genetics. It was directly
13. In fact, the lone dissenter in the case was one of the Four Horsemen, Justice Butler,
who, however, did not write an opinion providing the reason for his dissent. One possible
explanation is simply that the case did not involve a statute that was restricting traditional
property rights, which is the issue that divided the Court and defined the Four Horsemen. See
infra Section II.B. Thus there is no reason to expect that the Justices would divide along the
same lines in this case.
14. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
15.
See generally EDWIN BLACK, WAR AGAINST THE WEAK: EUGENICS AND AMERICA'S
CAMPAIGN TO CREATE A MASTER RACE (1st ed. 2003); MARK A. LARGENT, BREEDING CONTEMPT:
THE HISTORY OF COERCED STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2008); PAUL LOMBARDO, THREE
GENERATIONS, No IMBECILES (2008); VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V.

OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS 13-31 (2008).
16. They included William H. Welch, first Dean of Johns Hopkins Medical School and
president of the American Medical Association, Thomas Hunt Morgan, a genetic scientist who
won a Nobel Prize in 1933 for his pioneering work on chromosomes, and Irving Fisher, a founder
of neoclassic economics and econometrics. See BLACK, supra note 15, at 93-94; LOMBARDO, supra
note 15, at 32.
17. BLACK, supranote 15, at 31-57; LARGENT, supra note 15, at 42-44, 56.
18. BLACK, supranote 15, at 125-44.
19. Id. at 68, 99; LOMBARDO, supra note 15, at 26, 32.
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responsible for the development of both the IQ test and the SAT, 20
instruments that remain in use today and exercise major effects on
the educational opportunities of nearly all Americans. Viewed from
this perspective, compulsory sterilization might be compared to the
medical treatments that prevailed in the Western World for nearly
21
two thousand years based on the four bodily humors.
Another exculpatory analogy for compelled sterilization might
be slavery. We now regard slavery as an abomination even in its most
kindly guises, to say nothing of the horrific treatment that it more
frequently engendered. But no voice was raised against the practice
during the entire course of pre-modern history. No one, including such
towering ethicists as Plato, Aristotle, Epictetus (who was born a
slave), Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, or Locke, ever objected to it.22
The first general condemnation came from the Quakers, a
marginalized and scorned religious sect, in the late seventeenth
century. 23 Montesquieu seems to be the earliest major thinker to
express even tentative disapproval, 24 and there was no broader outcry
until the latter part of the eighteenth century. It seems safe to say,

20. See BLACK, supra note 15, at 76-83; STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN
176-262 (rev. ed. 1996); LEILA ZENDERLAND, MEASURING MINDS: HENRY HERBERT GODDARD AND
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE TESTING 153-85 (1998).
21. See LOIS N. MANGER, A HISTORY OF MEDICINE 98-103, 121-32 (2d ed. 2005); ROY
PORTER, THE GREATEST BENEFIT TO MANKIND: A MEDICAL HISTORY OF HUMANITY 56-58 (1999);
JOHN HUDSON TINER, EXPLORING THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE 12-37 (1999). For an extended
account of the theory from someone who still takes it seriously, see generally JEROME KAGAN,
GALEN'S PROPHECY: TEMPERAMENT IN HUMAN NATURE (1996).
22. As late as the seventeenth century, Grotius based his argument for the social contract
on what he regarded as the self-evident position that people could relinquish their natural
liberty because they could, after all, sell themselves into slavery. HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF
WAR AND PEACE 63-70 (A.C. Campbell trans., 1901) (1625); see also RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL
RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 95-98 (1979).
23. See THOMAS DRAKE, QUAKERS AND SLAVERY IN AMERICA (1950); HUGH THOMAS, THE
SLAVE TRADE 458-61 (1997). A century earlier, Bartolome de las Casas argued insistently, and
successfully, against the enslavement of Native Americans by the Spanish conquerors. The basis
for his argument, however, was that it was wrong to enslave people with a culture, not that
slavery was wrong in general, and his solution to the resulting labor shortage was to import
Africans as slaves. See THOMAS, supra,at 125-27.
24. CHARLES-LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 24677 (Ann Cohler, Basia Miller & Harold Stone transs., 1989) (1748). Even at this late date (the
book was published in 1748), Montesquieu felt the need to be circumspect in his condemnation.
He says:
If I had to defend the right we had of making Negroes slaves, here is what I would
say: ... A proof that Negroes do not have common sense is that they make more of a
glass necklace than one of gold ....
It is impossible for us to assume that these people
are men because if we assumed they were men one would begin to believe that we
ourselves were not Christians.
Id. at 250.
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therefore, that the abolition of slavery was simply not within anyone's
conceptual framework before modern times.
To be sure, there may be a difference between pre-modern
medicine and the pre-modern acceptance of slavery. Pre-modern
physicians were trying to do the same thing doctors do at present, and
which we recognize as morally praiseworthy, namely, cure their
patients. Their failures stemmed from a lack of empirical knowledge.
Slavery, in contrast, is something we now recognize as a moral wrong,
monstrous on its own terms and indicative of larger injustices in the
general society. But if no one recognized it as a wrong, what are we
doing when we condemn pre-modern people for accepting it other than
restating our contemporary views? This would seem to be the case
even when the judgment is framed as a condemnation of a particular
individual. To admonish Aristotle for accepting slavery can be most
readily understood as a warning to our colleagues: "Don't be such an
enthusiastic follower of Aristotle. When you praise his theory of
praxis, remember that comes from someone who accepted slavery and
may incorporate the injustices we associate with that practice." But
what can the condemnation of slavery say about Aristotle himself that
would be of any use in contemporary ethics: "Remember to conceive of
things you can't conceive of?"
Compulsory sterilization is not an issue of this sort, however.
While
it
enjoyed
widespread
support
among
scientists,
philanthropists, and government officials, it also engendered
substantial opposition. Many people were clearly uncomfortable with
it. Francis Galton, the British mathematician and statistician who
founded eugenics, was circumspect about its applications 25 and one of
his leading followers, David Heron, roundly condemned the scholarly
literature that supported it as "fallacious and indeed actually
dangerous to social welfare. ' 26 A number of American scientists and
medical experts voiced serious doubts as well. 27 Alexander Graham
Bell became uncomfortable with the unrestrained enthusiasm of the

25.
BLACK, supra note 15, at 18. Galton was clearly in favor of "positive eugenics," that is,
encouraging people to make genetically beneficial marriages. His support for "negative eugenics,"
including compulsory sterilization of the undesirable, is less clear. See id. at 19; MARTIN
BROOKES, EXTREME MEASURES: THE DARK VISIONS AND BRIGHT IDEAS OF FRANCIS GALTON 296

(2004) (noting Galton's strong association of hereditary determinism and eugenics in contrast to
sterilization and negative eugenics in the United States); LOMBARDO, supra note 15, at 7.
26.
BLACK, supranote 15, at 99-100; LOMBARDO, supra note 15, at 44. Similar doubts were
expressed by another of Galton's followers, Karl Pearson. BLACK, supra note 15, at 27, 60-61.
Galton, Heron and Pearson were all British; in general, the British scientists were much more
cautious than their American colleagues.
27. LARGENT, supranote 15, at 97-100; LOMBARDO, supranote 15, at 54-57.
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movement's proponents and gradually withdrew his participation. 28
Clarence Darrow, perhaps the most famous lawyer in America at that
time, published a withering condemnation. 29 Many public officials
were also skeptical. Several state legislatures rejected bills to
authorize compulsory sterilization for various characteristics. 30 When
the Pennsylvania legislature enacted such a bill, Governor Samuel
Pennypacker rejected it in ringing tones that voiced both moral
objections and scientific doubts. 31 A number of state courts struck
down compulsory sterilization laws on equal protection, due process,
or cruel and unusual punishment grounds. 32 The U.S. Army declined
to use intelligence tests developed by eugenicist Robert Yerkes as a
33
means of classifying inductees.
B. The Formal Criticismsof Buck v. Bell
Thus, the issue presented by compulsory sterilization is an
intriguing one. An active debate about the merits of this practice
existed at the time, with both sides represented; it was within people's
conceptual framework to express opposition, in contrast to the
situation with either pre-modern medicine or slavery. But the side
that is now "uniformly condemned" was an entirely acceptable position
and seems to have been the majority view when the issue first came
before the Supreme Court. It was, moreover, the view associated with
modern science and with important elements in the Progressive
movement. 34 The question then is whether we can condemn the Court
for failing to adopt the position that we take today. Should the
Justices have known that forced sterilization of citizens whom they
viewed as undesirable was wrong? Was there some warning sign,
some indication that signaled to them that they should have reached
the opposite result in Buck v. Bell?
28. BLACK, supra note 15, at 104-05.
29. LOMBARDO, supra note 15, at 155; NOURSE, supra note 15, at 15, 56. Referring to the
proponents of eugenic sterilization he wrote: "I shudder at their ruthlessness in meddling with
life. I resent their egoistic and stern righteousness." LOMBARDO, supra note 15, at 155.
30.

See LARGENT, supra note 15, at 66-71; LOMBARDO, supra note 15, at 21-22.

31. BLACK, supra note 15, at 66; LOMBARDO, supra note 15, at 22-23.
32. NOURSE, supra note 15, at 28-29. New York attorney Charles Boston, later president of
the American Bar Association, leveled harsh criticism at the procedural aspects of New Jersey's
law. LOMBARDO, supra note 15, at 53-54.
33. BLACK, supra note 15, at 84; GOULD, supra note 15, at 222-62.
34. LOMBARDO, supranote 15, at 17. Sanger was certainly a major figure in this movement.
On the Progressive Movement, see generally JOHN WHITECLAY CHAMBERS II, THE TYRANNY OF
CHANGE: AMERICA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890-1920 (2006); MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE
DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (2003); ROBERT
H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920 (1967).
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One possible way of answering this question is to search for
formal arguments, general rules of decision-making that can be
deployed independent of substantive norms, to resolve a contested
issue. Although, as stated at the outset, constitutional law tends to
rely on arguments of this nature, modern ethics and epistemology
generally rejects the validity of this approach. Some constitutional
lawyers, for example, appeal to the original intent of either the
Framers or the ratifying public, 35 but philosophers and literary critics
almost all insist that the meaning of a text is necessarily constructed
through an interaction between text and reader, with the reader's
36
substantive views playing a crucial role.
These theoretical objections are not necessarily decisive in the
constitutional law context, however. A formal argument need not be
universally valid in this context, as it would need to be as a
philosophic matter; it need only be valid in terms of our political
system. Kant's categorical imperative, for example, must be applicable
to the Ancient Greeks as well as to our own society, according to the
claim Kant advances for it. But a formal norm that guides
constitutional decision-making need only be valid for our own political
system, or, at the very most, for other democratic, rights-based
systems in the modern era.
1. Do No Harm
One such formal norm that we might claim that the Supreme
Court should have followed when confronted with the controversy over
compulsory sterilization is: "First, do no harm."37 To begin with, most
35.
See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); Gary Lawson & Guy

Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47 (2006); Antonin Scalia,
Originalism:The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
36.
See, e.g., TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (1983); STANLEY
FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1982);
HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Garrett Barden & John Cumming trans., 1988)
(1975); WOLFGANG ISER, THE ACT OF READING: A THEORY OF AESTHETIC RESPONSE (1978).

37. Primum non nocere. It is often attributed to the Hippocratic Oath. Although it does not
appear there as such, it can be regarded as consistent with the spirit of the Oath and it remains
a staple of medical ethics. See C.M. Smith, Origin and Uses of Primum Non Nocere: Above All,
Do No Harm, 45 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 371, 371-72 (2005) (describing origins and
fundamental role of the maxim in modern medical ethics). In political theory, it is Mill's basis for
government intervention. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in THE ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN
STUART MILL, 253, 263-66 (Max Lerner ed., 1961). He treats it as a general principle of morality,
in the sense that its violation justifies state restriction of individual liberty. For an extended
discussion of how harm to others is an essential principle justifying criminal laws, see generally
JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS (1984). The obverse principle, which is that the government
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interventions do some harm to someone, so the question is really the
relative balance between harm and benefit. Every surgical procedure,
for example, carries a statistical risk of death, but we would not
regard it with distrust if the risk is low and the countervailing
advantages are great. That was in fact one of the arguments about
the sterilizations, and once vasectomy replaced castration-due in
part to the pioneering work of the unfortunately named Dr. Sharpthe proponents were right about the limited risk of surgical mishaps. 38
In a political context, the harm principle is further limited
because most government programs occur within a socially
constructed space and involve alternatives that are equally
interventionist, although perhaps in different ways. One of the
prevailing controversies of the era that produced Buck v. Bell, for
example, was the conflict between industrial workers and their
capitalist employers. The employers claimed that they were being
harmed by Progressive legislation that impinged on their property
rights and liberty of contract. But the Progressive response was that
the legislation was alleviating conditions that were themselves the
product of society, including the property rights and other legal
protections that enabled capitalists to exercise control over their
employees. 39 In the substantive due process decisions of the era, such
as the eponymous Lochner v. New York, the Supreme Court may have
been applying the harm principle on the basis of the assumption that
the Progressive legislation was an intervention, while the property
laws and underlying economic conditions were natural occurrences.
That is one basis for contemporary arguments that these decisions
were mistaken. 40

should not cause harm but only prevent it, can be derived from Mill's formulation. It is often
invoked in international law regarding one nation's intervention in another's internal affairs. See
generally DAVID N. GIBBS, FIRST DO No HARM:
DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAVIA (2009).

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

AND THE

38.
See BLACK, supra note 15, at 63-66; LARGENT, supra note 15, at 28-31; LOMBARDO,
supra note 15, at 23-24. Evidence for this is that men continue to obtain voluntary vasectomies
as a means of birth control. The sterilization of women through tubal ligation is equally safe
today, but this procedure was not available at the time of Buck v. Bell. See Robert K. Zurawin &
Michel E. Rivlin, Tubal Sterilization,MEDSCAPE (Jan. 23, 2015), http://emedicine.medscape.com/
article/266799-overview [https://perma.cc/5NB8-P7KY]. The Court should have been at least
more cognizant of the potential danger of the existing method of sterilization, the one that was
used on Carrie Buck.
39.
CHAMBERS, supra note 34, at 132-50; MCGERR, supra note 34, at 13-19, 125-46;
WIEBE, supra note 34, at 164-95.
40. For further explication of this point, see Edward L. Rubin, The Illusion of Property as a
Right and Its Reality as an Imperfect Alternative, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 573, 600-04 (2013) (offering
a full explication of how early substantive due process cases misconstrued the Fourteenth
Amendment's interaction with property rights).
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Compulsory sterilization, however, seems to be one situation
where the harm principle could have applied. The operation itself may
have been safe, but the Court seemed oblivious to its impact on the
individuals subjected to it. Having children is widely regarded as one
of human life's greatest rewards, whether it is viewed in terms of
perpetuating one's name and memory, transmitting one's values,
serving the purposes of one's race, religion, or nation, creating an
intense emotional relationship, or providing for care in one's old age.
The most rudimentary consultation of common human experience and,
for most of the Justices, their own personal feelings, should have been
sufficient to indicate the magnitude of the harm that compulsory
sterilization inflicted. A mere sixteen years later, in Skinner v.
Oklahoma, a different set of Justices were fully able to articulate this
concern, and did so explicitly at the start of the opinion, 4 1 although
they decided the case on other grounds, for reasons that will be
described below.
Moreover, the interventionist character of the procedure is
apparent. Every society interprets and regulates sexual activity in
different ways, but reproduction itself is clearly independent of the
social process. To impede such a basic human activity would seem to
demand justification at a somewhat higher level than the choice
between two contesting parties whose position is defined within the
framework of society. In other words, the more basic or universal the
interest that is being harmed, the more cautious society should be
about intruding on that interest. Of course, different societies
maintain different views about the natural order of the universe and
the rules or practices that are inscribed within it. To demand that
people in the past subscribe to twentieth-century social constructivism
is as unreasonable as to demand that they adopt our specific values.
But people can be charged with their own level of awareness on this
issue. Everyone in the twentieth century understood that social
arrangements, property rights, and methods of governance had varied
over the course of Western history and had been debated by leading
political theorists, while no one questioned that reproduction and the
desire to have children, whether derived from God or explained by
Darwin, was a human universal.

41.
316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942). Justice Douglas wrote: 'This case touches a sensitive and
important area of human rights. Oklahoma deprives certain individuals of a right which is basic
to the perpetuation of a race, the right to have offspring." Id. at 536.
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2. Act on the Basis of the Truth
A second formal principle that might have informed the Court's
decision in Buck v. Bell is the empirical justification for the
intervention at issue. The extent to which this principle should be
modified when the decision maker is a court, and particularly a court
reviewing legislation in a democratic system, will be addressed in the
discussion of pragmatic contextualization that follows. For now, the
question is normative contextualization. What sort of evidence should
a decision maker, or a critical observer, demand when determining
whether a particular social program is justifiable? We are in the midst
of several such debates at the present time, involving crucial issues
such as climate change, the safety of genetically modified food, and the
future direction of our economy. The anguish and uncertainty that we
presently experience when confronting such issues should caution us
against quick condemnations of the Buck v. Bell Court on the basis of
hindsight.
One source of guidance for this complicated question is the
society's prevailing structure of knowledge. We might be inclined to
condemn Medieval Europeans for denying religious liberty. For them,
however, Christianity was much more than a religion, as we currently
use the term; it was a comprehensive explanatory system that
accounted for their physical surroundings, the movement of the sun,
moon, and stars, the behavior of human beings, and the basis of
government. 42 Given this perspective, dissenting views of religion
were not an expression of personal faith but false statements whose
obvious invalidity robbed them of either informative or expressive
value. This view cannot be attributed to some general resistance
against new ideas, as the now-outdated canard about the Middle Ages
would suggest. The fourteenth century, for example, was a time of
tremendous innovation in the arts, including vernacular literature of
Dante, Boccaccio, Petrarch, and Chaucer, 43 the realistic, quasi42.
NORMAN CANTOR, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE MIDDLE AGES 373--93 (rev. ed. 1993);
FREDERICK COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, VOLUME II: MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY FROM
AUGUSTINE TO DUNS SCOTUS 218-387 (1993); HEINRICH FICHTENAU, LIVING IN THE TENTH

CENTURY: MENTALITIES AND SOCIAL ORDERS 245-332 (Patrick J. Geary trans., 1993) (1991);
JACQUES LE GOFF, THE MEDIEVAL IMAGINATION 27-43, 67-77, 83-103 (Arthur Goldhammer,
trans., 1988) (1985); WILLIAM MANCHESTER, A WORLD LIT ONLY BY FIRE: THE MEDIEVAL MIND
AND THE RENAISSANCE: PORTRAIT OF AN AGE 15-25 (1992); J.A. Watt, Spiritual and Temporal
Powers, in J.H. BURNS, THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT, C. 360-

1450, at 367 (1988).
43.

See DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY: THE INFERNO, PURGATORIO AND PARADISO

(Lawrence Grant White trans., 1948) (1321); GIOVANNI BOCCACCIO, THE DECAMERON (John
Payne trans., 1982) (1351); GEOFFREY CHAUCER, THE CANTERBURY TALES (Jill Mann ed., 2005)
(1475); PETRARCH, THE POETRY OF PETRARCH (David Young, trans., 2005). See generally LYNN
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perspectival painting of Giotto, 44 and the polyphonic ars nova music of
Machaut. 45 But none of these innovations challenged religion as the
dominant mode of explanation; indeed, they were equally centered on
religion as their predecessors, and simply presented similar religious
views in different ways.
By the twentieth century, our society's dominant mode of
explanation was natural science; that is what we rely upon to explain
our physical surroundings (including the sun, moon, and stars) and
the behavior of human beings. If someone from the future were to visit
us and tell us that our entire conception of science is mistaken, we
might well respond with protests of innocence: how were we to know?
But disputes occurring within the framework of science are issues that
we can comprehend and that we can be properly expected to take into
account when reaching decisions that affect people's lives. Thus, the
formal principle is that a decision maker should make its best effort to
base its decisions on truthful premises, with the contextualizing
caveat that each society will have its own theory for determining the
truth.
According to this principle, we are currently entitled to rely on
the theory of evolution, and anyone who opposes the search for new
antibiotics on the grounds that viruses cannot evolve can be properly
condemned. We have reached this same level of scientific consensus
regarding global warming, and the Republican Party deniers will
certainly, and justifiably, be condemned by subsequent generations.
But the eugenic theory that served as the basis for compulsory
sterilization did not possess so secure a scientific status. While it could
claim support from Darwinian evolution and Mendelian genetics,
many voices within the scientific community were raised against it.46
Many people, including important disciples of its British originator
and well-regarded researchers in the United States, while accepting
ARNER, CHAUCER, GOWER, AND THE VERNACULAR RISING: POETRY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE
POPULACE AFTER 1381 (2013); DOUGLAS GREY, CHAUCER AND THE GROWTH OF VERNACULAR
LITERATURE, C. 1350-1500 (2006); MARTIN EISNER, BOCCACCIO AND THE INVENTION OF ITALIAN
LITERATURE: DANTE, PETRARCH, CALVALCANTI AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE VERNACULAR (2013);
ERNST ROBERT CURTIUS, EUROPEAN LITERATURE AND THE LATIN MIDDLE AGES (1953).
44.
See generally BRUCE COLE, GIOTTO AND FLORENTINE PAINTING 1280-1375 (1977);
SAMUEL Y. EDGERTON, THE HERITAGE OF GIOTTO'S GEOMETRY: ART AND SCIENCE ON THE EVE OF

THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (1981); Robert Smith, Giotto, Artistic Realism, Political Realism, 4
J. MEDIEVAL HIST. 267 (1978).
45.
See generally ARDIS BUTTERFIELD, POETRY AND MUSIC IN MEDIEVAL FRANCE: FROM
JEAN RENART TO GUILLAUME DE MACHAUT (2009); ALICE V. CLARK, GUILLAUME DE MACHAUT
(2012); YOLANDA PLUMLEY, THE ART OF GRAFTED SONG: CITATION AND ILLUSION IN THE AGE OF
MACHAUT (2013).

46. See supra text accompanying notes 25-33 (identifying the numerous sources of
opposition to the Eugenics movement both within and beyond the scientific community).
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its basic premises, challenged the validity of its conclusions. In other
words, the basis of the sterilization programs was a contested, albeit
not invalidated, scientific theory.
Thus, while we cannot charge the Buck v. Bell Court with our
present view that the sterilization programs were based on
pseudoscience, we can charge it with a failure to be attuned to the
controversies that existed at the time. The offhand dismissal of
47
opposing views that is implicit in Justice Holmes's infamous phrase
reflects a mental slovenliness that can be condemned without
anachronism. When a decision is being made that involves serious
consequences for people, as indicated by the harm principle described
above, or perhaps some more specific standard, a decision maker
should feel obligated to scrutinize the issue according to the theory of
validity that prevails at the time. In the 1920s, as now, that theory
was natural science. It is precisely because natural science is our
dominant mode of explanation and we cannot be expected to move
outside it, that disputes occurring within the scientific community
must be taken seriously. The Court's decision in Buck v. Bell can thus
be regarded as a bad one on this formal basis.
C. The Substantive Criticismof Buck v. Bell
These formal arguments indicate some of the problems with
the Court's decision, which allowed state governments to inflict
serious harm on their citizens on the basis of an inadequately
supported scientific theory. But they do not seem to get at the core of
our concern, the truly objectionable character of Buck v. Bell. This
sense of dissatisfaction suggests the intrinsic weakness of formal
arguments: their inability to connect with the things that we feel most
deeply about. What seems to be required is a substantive argument,
that is, an affirmative assertion of values specific to our culture.
Substantive arguments possess a greater force precisely because they
are culturally specific; they embody commitments that a society has
developed through its cultural experience and exist within the socially
constructed space that generates commitments of this kind. It is
arguments of this kind that Chemerinsky relies upon, in contrast to
the formal arguments typical of constitutional jurisprudence, when he
says that so many of the Supreme Court's decisions reach results that
are "uniformly condemned by subsequent generations of scholars and
48
judges."
47.
48.

Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) ("three generations of imbeciles are enough').
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 4.
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The substantive value that Buck v. Bell violates is an emerging
morality of self-fulfillment: one that stands in contrast to the
traditional morality that has no generally accepted name, but that I
believe can be described as a morality of higher purposes. 49 According
to that earlier morality, moral actions were defined as those that
contributed to one's own salvation in the personal realm and to the
strength and glory of one's kingdom or nation in the political realm.
For a variety of reasons, this view gradually yielded, over the course of
the past two-and-a-half centuries, to the contrasting view that moral
actions are defined as those that enable each person to define their
own life path, and follow it as fully as they can, subject to other
people's equal right to do the same. In political terms, this means that
people are no longer expected to serve the state; rather, the agreedupon purpose of the state is to serve its people.
This sea change in morality has a wide range of
manifestations; the one most relevant to Buck v. Bell is that
government must treat all persons within its jurisdiction as entitled to
the liberty and opportunity that will allow them to define their life
paths and strive for self-fulfillment. This does not mean that the
government of a given jurisdiction cannot deploy force to exercise
control over its citizens. Weber is right in saying that the ability to use
50
force is the basis for all in functional or legitimate government.
Rather, it means that the government must be able to assert a strong
justification for imposing significant impairments of individual liberty.
The standard justifications are state necessity and individual
wrongfulness. Thus, the government may conscript groups of people
for the military in the cause of national defense, but it can rarely
compel them to perform less crucial tasks. It may impose involuntary
servitude on individuals, but only as punishment for crime. It may
also impose other liberty-denying punishments, but in all cases it can
only do so by establishing, by valid legislation, that a certain action is
a crime, and then demonstrating, by due process of law, that the
individual committed the designated action.
A central question in the formulation of this basic right, of
course, is the scope of the protected liberty. In general, it can be said
that the boundaries of any general, socially constructed principle such
as a right to liberty will be contested in society, and that the
determination of those boundaries is as central to the social norm as

49.

EDWARD L. RUBIN, SOUL, SELF, AND SOCIETY: THE NEW MORALITY AND THE MODERN

STATE 13-16, 113 (2015).
50.

1978).

MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 56, 212-26 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
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the recognition of the principle itself. At the time Buck v. Bell was
decided, much of the controversy about the contours of the right to
liberty involved the Supreme Court's effort to expand the liberty right
so that it included economic rights that were not previously covered.
Current revisionist accounts assert that the Court was simply
maintaining the existing scope of liberty, 51 but there can be no
question, in that case, that it was doing so in a manner that struck
down an increasing number of state and federal statutes that were
justified by claims that they were protecting personal liberty against
private oppression.
The problem with Buck v. Bell is that the Court, in its effort to
either expand or deploy the right to liberty in unprecedented ways,
missed a more basic and essential aspect of this right. This is the idea
that the integrity of the body is an essential component of liberty, and
that the state must treat the body as inviolable unless it can justify
the deprivation of liberty itself on the basis of state necessity or
individual wrongfulness.
An aspect of the preceding morality of higher purposes was
that the individual's subordination to these purposes included the
control of their bodies. In social terms, the basic view was that society
was necessarily constructed as a hierarchy, ranging from the king
through the nobility to free peasants and to serfs or slaves, just as the
natural order was constructed as a hierarchy ranging from God to
angels to humans to animals to vermin. 52 The concept of rights
certainly existed, but rights were determined by one's status in
society, not one's identity as a human being. A nobleman's body was
generally inviolable, but at the other end of the spectrum, unfree
people had no rights, which meant that they could be owned, that is, a
higher-ranking individual could take virtually complete control of
their bodies. 53 This view is responsible for the universal, unreflective
51.
DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 127 (2011); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED:
THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER 10-11 (1993); DAVID MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT:
REDISCOVERING A LOST CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 5-6 (2011). Two other books that offer related
arguments are BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 33-40 (1998) (arguing that the 1937 change in doctrine has been

misunderstood due to simplistic characterizations of the preceding Court's due process decisions)
and NOGA MORAG-LEVINE, CATCHING THE WIND: REGULATING AIR POLLUTION IN THE COMMON

LAW STATE 63-85 (2003) (arguing that the Lochner Court's decisions stemmed from its
understanding of common law as much as from its expansive definition of liberty).
52. This hierarchical structure was known as the Great Chain of Being. See generally
ARTHUR LOVEJOY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1960).

53. The number of people who were actually owned, that is, were slaves, varied over the
course of Western history. In the Early Middle Ages, unfree household servants were true slaves;
they were regarded as movable property or cattle, and their owners could thus exercise virtually
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acceptance of slavery that we find so astonishing today. Lower status
people-not only slaves but anyone below the status of a landowner54
could be tortured if accused of a crime, or even required as a witness.
Ordinary soldiers and sailors-almost always from the lower classesas well as servants were regularly subjected to corporal punishment
for inadequate performance of their duties, as well as for noncriminal
misbehavior. 55 The social hierarchy was reiterated within the family,
where the father played the role of king and was thus legally
authorized and socially justified in using physical force against both
his wife and his children. 56 By extension of this parental right,
teachers regularly beat their students, of all social classes, for failing
7
to learn the assigned material.5
The reason why these practices, which we now regard as
unpalatable brutality, were so widely and uncritically accepted is that
they were fully consonant with the prevailing morality of higher
purposes. People were supposed to serve the social order and the state,
provided that those demands did not conflict with their effort to
achieve salvation in the afterlife. Thus, their bodies could be treated
complete control over their bodies. MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 255-56 (L.A. Manyon trans.,
1961) (1939); FICHTENAU, supra note 42, at 370-73; JOSEPH O'CALLAGHAN, A HISTORY OF
MEDIEVAL SPAIN 292-93 (1975). Serfs were unfree, but they were not slaves, of course, and their
masters' rights over their bodies were constrained. See BLOCH, supra, at 256-74 (discussing the
social structure of serfdom); FRANCES & JOSEPH GIES, LIFE IN A MEDIEVAL VILLAGE 67-80 (1990).
Serfdom displaced slavery to a large extent during the High Middle Ages, but slavery did not
disappear; there were household slaves in fourteenth century Florence, and "everyone in the
house reprimanded and beat them, including the master, the mistress and older children."
Georges Duby, Dominque Barthelemy & Charles de la Ronciere, Portraits,in A HISTORY OF
PRIVATE LIFE: VOLUME II: REVELATIONS OF THE MEDIEVAL WORLD 33, 233 (Georges Duby ed.,
Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1988). Shortly thereafter, the Atlantic slave trade began, and the
number of people enslaved by Western nations skyrocketed. See HUGH THOMAS, THE SLAVE
TRADE: THE STORY OF THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE: 1440-1870, at 153-54 (1997) (noting the
internationalization of the slave trade after the Portuguese inroads in Africa in the fifteenth
century). In the United States, slavery involved near-total control of the slaves' bodies, even if
that control was not always exercised. See DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE RISE
AND FALL OF SLAVERY IN THE NEW WORLD 193-96 (2006); EUGENE GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN,
ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 63-69 (1974); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR
INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 141-236 (1989). This control included the
power to castrate male slaves; the practice was in decline in the nineteenth century, and
sometimes forbidden, but it continued to exist. GENOVESE, supra, at 67-68.
54. See JOHN LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN THE
ANCIEN REGIME 45-48 (1976); EDWARD PETERS, TORTURE 40-72 (rev. ed. 1996); STEVEN PINKER,
THE BETER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 144-49 (2011). Pinker,
however, seems a bit confused about the distinction between punitive and investigatory torture.
55. PINKER, supranote 54, at 146.
56.

BARBARA

HANAWALT,

THE TIES THAT BOUND:

PEASANT FAMILIES IN MEDIEVAL

ENGLAND 182-85 (1986); PINKER, supra note 54, at 428-41.
57. PHILIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 252-68
(Robert Baldick trans., Vintage Books 1965) (1962).
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as instruments for the achievement of these goals. The sacrifice of the
body for metaphysical purposes was morally prohibited, a principle
that Western society has learned from both its Jewish and GrecoRoman ancestors. 58 But its sacrifice for the pragmatic purposes of
society and state was regarded as entirely acceptable.
The morality of self-fulfillment began displacing the morality of
higher purposes at the end of the eighteenth century and has been
progressing steadily since then. Its defining principle-that people
should determine their own life path and have the maximum possible
opportunity for doing so-demands that they have control of their
bodies as well as their minds.5 9 The ever-strengthening opposition to
state-imposed religion, censorship, and any sort of punishment for
transmitting or receiving information has been paralleled by an
increasing social aversion to the invasion of the body. Not only has
slavery been outlawed, it is now also recognized as emblematic of
social injustice, so much so that we find it difficult to understand its
previous acceptability. 60 Our aversion to this sort of compulsion is
now so great that it extends to comparatively mild practices such as
the specific enforcement of employment contracts. 61 Torture, as either
a method of investigation or a form of punishment, is morally
repugnant in all its forms; the Bush II Administration invoked the

58. See Genesis 22:1-19 (substitution of the ram for Isaac); see also 2 ROBERT GRAVES, THE
GREEK MYTHS 24-25 (1960) (punishment of Tantalus for serving his son's body to the gods, this
being the curse on the House of Atreus); GRAVES, supra, at 52-54 (murder of Agamemnon by
Clytemnestra for his sacrifice of Iphigenia at Aulis). In Euripides' version of the story, Iphigenia
is rescued by Artemis and a deer substituted in her place. EURIPIDES, TEN PLAYS 243, 244
(Moses Hadas & John McClean trans., Bantam Classics 1960) (414 BCE).
59. RUBIN, supra note 49, at 113-75.
60. Despite the definitive rejection of slavery in the United States following the Civil War,
moral condemnation of the system is an ongoing cultural process. Pre-World War II histories of
American slavery often portrayed it in genial terms. See, e.g., ULRICH PHILLIPS, AMERICAN
NEGRO SLAVERY: A SURVEY OF THE SUPPLY, EMPLOYMENT AND CONTROL OF NEGRO LABOR, AS
DETERMINED BY THE PLANTATION REGIME (1918) (slavery was economically inefficient but not
excessively cruel); see also RALPH B. FLANDERS, PLANTATION SLAVERY IN GEORGIA (1933);
CHARLES S. SYDNOR, SLAVERY IN MISSISSIPPI (1933); CHARLES S. DAVIS, THE COT'rON KINGDOM
IN ALABAMA (1939). It was only with GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944), and
KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH (1956)

that modern American historians began documenting the slave system as a regime of horror.
That is now the prevailing view. See, e.g., DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE RISE
AND FALL OF SLAVERY IN THE NEW WORLD (2006); EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY:
AMERICAN FREEDOM (1975). The same process has occurred in popular culture. The moonlight
and magnolias sensibility of GONE WITH THE WIND (MGM Studios 1939) has been replaced, but
only quite recently, by depictions of slavery's horrors. See, e.g., DJANGO UNCHAINED (Columbia
Pictures 2012); 12 YEARS A SLAVE (Fox Searchlight 2013).

61.
(1978).

See generally Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351
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justification of state necessity under conditions of emergency, 62 but
was nonetheless subjected to intense protest.63 Physical abuse of one's
spouse or child is now defined as a criminal offense and a moral
wrong, and even milder physical chastisement of disobedient children
is increasingly disfavored. 64 Most European nations have outlawed
corporal punishment in schools, and even in the retrograde United
States only 19 states, largely in the South and West, continue to
permit it. 65
At present, we have reached the point where even the bodies of
convicted criminals are protected. 66 We have replaced the physical
torture of the premodern legal system with punishments that confine
convicts but leave their bodies inviolate. 67 To be sure, those convicted
of a crime remain subject to involuntary servitude, the only exception
to the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition. This is justified, of course,

62. Memorandum from Jay Bybee & John Yoo to John Rizzo on Interrogation of Al Qaeda
Operative (Aug. 1, 2002), https://www.justice.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/olc/legacy/2OlO/08/05/memobybee2002.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RXX-FU6H]; see also ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM
WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT: RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 131-63 (2003) (arguing
for establishing torture warrants in the case of "ticking bomb terrorists').
63.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, THE TORTURE REPORT (2014). See

generally DAVID LUBAN, TORTURE, POWER AND LAW (2014); ALFRED W. MCCOY, TORTURE AND
IMPUNITY: THE U.S. DOCTRINE OF COERCIVE INTERROGATION (2012); SANFORD LEVINSON,
TORTURE: A COLLECTION (2006); Kim Scheppele, Hypothetical Torture in the "War on Terrorism",
1 J. NAT'L SECURITY & POLy 285 (2005).
64. Significantly, political conservatives who attempt to maintain certain elements of the
older morality of higher purposes (through opposition to abortion and same sex marriage) tend to
rely on physical chastisement of children to a much greater extent than liberals or progressives
who more fully accept the new morality. See GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: How LIBERALS
AND CONSERVATIVES THINK 339-78 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing this phenomenon).
65. Melinda Anderson, Where Teachers are Still Allowed to Spank Students, THE ATLANTIC
(Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/12/corporal-punishment/
420420/ [https://perma.cc/9PWT-QPCS]; Valerie Strauss, 19 States Still Allow Corporal
Punishment in Schools, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
answer-sheet/wp/2014/09/18/19-states-still-allow-corporal-punishment-in-school/
[https://perma.cc/T5Q4-BX5G].
66. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 688 F.2d 266, 267-68 (5th Cir. 1982) (court order eliminating use of
prisoners as guards in Texas prisons due to their brutality toward prisoners); Jackson v. Bishop,
404 F.2d 571, 579-80 (8th Cir. 1968) (enjoining corporal punishment used in Arkansas prisons,
including beatings with a leather strap and administering electric shocks to the prisoner's
genitals); see also MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 56-57, 85-88 (1998); STEVE
MARTIN & SHELDON EKLAND-OLSON, TExAS PRISONS: THE WALLS CAME TUMBLING DOWN (1987).
67. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d
ed. 1995) (1977), repeatedly describes modern incarceration as exercising control over the
prisoners' bodies. This can be taken, however, as an effort to appear profound by saying
something that is incorrect in a portentous manner. The whole point of modern incarceration is
to punish the prisoner without inflicting physical pain or mutilation. To do so involves
confinement, but it is confinement of the person, not the body, an essential distinction when
speaking about physical treatment.
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by their wrongful behavior. But forced labor that has the effect of
torture has been prohibited since the prisoners' rights decisions of the
1960s and '70s, and so has corporal punishment for misbehavior. 68 In
other words, the development of the modern, self-fulfillment-based
norm that people's bodies are exclusively their own has reached the
point where even a misbehaving criminal cannot be subjected to
physical mistreatment. 69
What seems most offensive about the Court's decision in Buck
v. Bell is its blindness to this social norm. To be sure, the norm was
not nearly so well established at the time as it is today. Slavery was
certainly anathema, physical torture was unacceptable, and child
abuse was becoming a recognized problem, 70 but children were still
being beaten at home and in school, while corporal punishment of
prisoners was common. Thus, once the decision is placed in the
normative context of the time, it does not appear quite as offensive as
it does to us today. But, with due consideration given to that context,
it was disappointing at the very least. We can justifiably expect people
to be on the evolving rather than the receding edge of social norms,
precisely because such norms reflect our developing sense of right and
wrong. To condemn Aristotle, Cicero, or Aquinas for tolerating slavery
may be anachronistic, since there was no discernable trend in the
direction of our current norms during their time. But the situation
with Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, and Robert E. Lee is
different; they should have known where society was headed, and can
be justly and meaningfully condemned for their opposition to that
emerging norm. The same can be said of the Supreme Court in Buck v.
Bell.
Moreover, this general trend of social morality during the
1920s and 30s can be stated in more specific terms. The prevailing
68.

See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 66, at 51-95.

69.

GRAEME NEWMAN, JUST AND PAINFUL: THE CASE FOR CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF

CRIMINALS (1983), offers the argument that safely administered physical punishment would
likely be more effective as both special and general deterrence, and significantly less expensive.
He is certainly right about the expense. One physician and two nurses (no anesthesiologist
required), equipped with a simple medical office, could readily cut off a hand from two thousand
thieves per year, at a total personnel and equipment cost of one million dollars or so. The cost of
incarcerating that many people for three years each would be close to six hundred million
dollars. See Christian Henrichson & Ruth Delaney, The Price of Prisons: What Incarceration
Costs Taxpayers (2012) (Vera Inst. for Crim. Justice Study) (finding marginal cost of
incarceration to average $31,307 per year). What makes any attempt to realize these enormous
savings inconceivable is our norm against purposeful mutilation of the body.
70. See generally Neil Howard Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of
Parens Patriae, 22 S.C. L. REV. 147 (1970); Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An
Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae:
From Chancery to the Juvenile 23 S.C. L. REV. 205 (1971).
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argument for compelled sterilization was that the children of impaired
individuals, being similarly impaired, would be a burden to society. 71
This is a virtually explicit statement of the premodern morality that
the individual's purpose was to serve society, that people could be
enslaved, conscripted, tortured, and generally sacrificed for more
important goals. By the time Buck v. Bell was decided, the Court
should have known that this argument was normatively unacceptable,
that it was a violation of the individual's autonomy. 72 Such sacrifices,
to the extent that they could be imposed at all, could only be imposed
as punishment for wrongful behavior, that is, as punishment, or for
purposes of collective survival, such as national defense. This
argument against compelled sterilization was well known at the time,
and it seems disgraceful, as Chemerinsky argues, that the Court was
unresponsive to it.

II. PRAGMATIC CONTEXTUALIZATION
As we look back on the past, and attempt to judge people's
performance in conceptual terms, there is a natural tendency to view
these people as abstract entities, apart from their real-world or
pragmatic context. However willing we may be to consider the mental
frameworks that prevailed at the time, we may nonetheless overlook
the practical realities in which they were embedded. One explanation
for this tendency is that mental frameworks are abstract, whereas
pragmatic contextualization is phenomenological. 73 To place people in
their conceptual context, we need only study the prevailing views of
the entire society. Absent unusual conditions, we can then assume
that any knowledgeable member of the society had access to those
views, so that their actions can be assessed against that conceptual

71.
BLACK, supra note 15, at 39-40, 138-43, 153-54; LARGENT, supra note 15, at 64-73;
LOMBARDO, supra note 15, at 43-47; NOURSE, supra note 15, at 21-23.
72. Instead, the Court reiterated the argument. See 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927):
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens
for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the
strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those
concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for
all the world if, instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime or to let
them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit
from continuing their kind.
73. For the basic principles of phenomenology, see generally EDMUND HUSSERL, IDEAS: A
GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PURE PHENOMENOLOGY (W.R. Boyce Gibson trans., Routledge 2d ed.

2012) (1931);
EDMUND HUSSERL,
CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS: A
PHENOMENOLOGY (Dorion Cairns trans., Kluwer Academic 1999) (1950).
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background.7 4 But to appreciate people's pragmatic context, we need
to understand their experience as individuals. It is not only the case
that the view from a mountain looks different than the view from the
valley below, but also that the view from one mountain looks different
75
than the view from another mountain.
The dramatic case of slavery provides a useful illustration. As
stated above, it makes more sense to condemn Thomas Jefferson or
John C. Calhoun for their support of slavery than it does to condemn
Pericles or Cicero. 76 But Calhoun and Jefferson were also slave
owners, and that must at least be taken into consideration. We must
ask ourselves how willing we would be to relinquish a significant
proportion of our personal wealth in support of a principle that was
normatively preferable but not legally enforced. 77 One might also ask
the question in connection with a member of a law firm that was
representing slave owners (whether enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act
or otherwise) or simply a non-slave owning storekeeper in a Southern
city. How willing would we be to sacrifice a desirable job on the basis
of a normative principle, or to incur the condemnation of our
immediate community? In the final analysis, we may nonetheless
decide that the slave owner, the lawyer, and the storekeeper merit
condemnation. What we should not do, however, is to assume that the
only forces acting on them were conceptual; we need to ask how it felt
for the particular person we are considering to be located where that
person actually was, in a pragmatic context as vivid and demanding
78
as the one in which we find ourselves.
74.
In the past, that may have been true for only a minority of the society's members, but
anyone whose actions we would be inclined to judge is likely to fall within that minority. In other
words, they will be leaders of the society. In discussing the subsistence farmers, or peasants, in
pre-modern European nations, we may want to determine their motivations, but our approach
would be sociological: it would be odd to ask if they were behaving morally. Such questions are
typically reserved for the society's leaders or power holders, and they would have access to its
conceptual framework.
75. A simple formulation of the phenomenological approach to human experience is that it
is grounded on the idea that "I am always here." I am not there. If I were there, that "there"
would become my "here." I would not have changed the fact that my experience is grounded in
my location, but I would have had a different experience.
76. The first member of each pair was an unusually intelligent and well-educated ruler; the
second member was a political leader who was also a leading political theorist of his day.
77. One's willingness to make ordinary charitable contributions, even at the tithing level
(one tenth) is not an answer to this challenge. The whole point of setting this level (whether or
not the contributions are tax deductible) is that it does not impair the benefactor's basic life
style.
78. This is essentially the question that Kierkegaard asks the reader in his re-telling of the
sacrifice of Isaac. SOREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING AND THE SICKNESS UNTO DEATH

21, 26-37 (Walter Lowrie trans., Princeton University Press 1954) (1849). How willing would we
be to sacrifice our child in obedience to what we perceive as a divine command?
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A great deal of scholarship has been devoted to the proper role
that the Supreme Court should play in a democratic system. That
scholarship is certainly relevant to the present inquiry, but the issue
here is a bit narrower: it is the answer, or the range of answers, that
the members of the Supreme Court were considering at the time of the
decision in question. In other words, for any given decision, how did
the members of the Court conceive their role at that particular time,
and how should they have conceived that role? This is the question
that Robert Cover asks in his discussion of the choices facing antislavery judges in the decades prior to the Civil War. 9 Again, it is open
to us to declare that the members of the Court were wrong, and that
they should have reconceived their role and reconsidered their
conclusions. What we may not do, if we want to ask the question
seriously, is to ignore the reality that they were members of an
institution and were strongly influenced by the beliefs and
expectations that accompanied that institutional position.
A. Focusing on Human Rights
As noted above, Chemerinsky's book derives from the premise
that the basic purpose of judicial review is to protect human rights.
This is a widely, although not universally, accepted view, but the
question under consideration is whether it is simply our present view,
and that imposing it as a judgment on the past represents a Whig
interpretation of history. As such, the question becomes one of
pragmatic contextualization. Is the protection of rights intrinsic to the
entire enterprise of judicial review, as it has developed in the United
States, so that it can be said that Justices who do not advance at least
some aspect of this enterprise were failing in an essential aspect of
their role? If not, then even if a particular practice violates a
developing human rights norm, it would not be incumbent upon courts
to rule against that practice.
There is a complex interplay between this question of role
morality and the contours of legal doctrine. One institutional role
consideration on which everyone agrees is that courts cannot use
judicial review to overturn a particular social practice, unless they can
justify their ruling by reference to the constitutional text. Some issues
lie outside virtually anyone's interpretation, and are thus inaccessible
to judges acting in their institutional role, however they might feel as

79.

See generally ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL

PROCESS (1984) (examining the antebellum judge's concept of his judicial role).
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individuals.8 0 An example is an issue that in many ways paralleled
compelled sterilization, which was the use of lobotomy for the
treatment of people with alleged mental disturbances. 8 ' Lobotomy,
like eugenics, garnered significant scientific support in the 1930s and
40s, and was also justified by the rationale that it prevented the
people subjected to it from being a burden to society.82 Like
sterilization, it also engendered both scientific and humanitarian
opposition at the time, and has subsequently been rejected with a
sense of horror at its prior popularity.8 3 It was carried out by private
physicians, however, usually under legal authority that was well
established for other treatments, and no constitutional objection was
articulated. Thus, unlike compelled sterilization, it lay beyond the
reach of legal doctrine as it was understood at the time, and the Court
cannot be charged for its failure to oppose it.
But while doctrine has established boundaries at any given
time, it is of course dependent on interpretation. A court can be
criticized on normative grounds for failing to change or reinterpret
doctrine, just as private individuals can be criticized for failing to
change their moral sentiments. To be sure, stare decisis provides a
countervailing institutional norm for courts, so we might want to
allow them more time to change their views, assuming it is possible to
make such fine distinctions. It is also possible to argue that one or the
other interpretation is preferable on purely doctrinal or formal
grounds, depending on one's theory of interpretation. But there is no a

80. The extent to which text or doctrine limits judicial decisions is of course a matter of
dispute. Stanley Fish argues that texts cannot impose any objective or external limits on the
interpreter. See FISH, supra note 36. Many legal scholars disagree, of course. See, e.g., Owen
Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 739-55 (1982) ("Interpretation,
whether it be in the law or literary domains, is neither a wholly discretionary nor a wholly
mechanical activity. It is a dynamic interaction between reader and text .. "). But the argument
here refers only to limits that are perceived and accepted in context, that is, at a given time in a
given culture. Fish does not argue against such limits; indeed, he specifically acknowledges them
as evidence for the non-existence of culturally independent limits. See Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss,
36 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1332-39 (1984) (distinguishing Fiss's views from his own).
81.
See generally STANLEY FINGER, ORIGINS OF NEUROSCIENCE: A HISTORY OF
EXPLORATIONS INTO BRAIN FUNCTION 290-96 (1994); JENELL JOHNSON, AMERICAN LOBOTOMY: A
RHETORICAL HISTORY (2014); JACK D. PRESSMAN, PSYCHOSURGERY AND THE LIMITS OF MEDICINE

(1999); German E. Berrios, The Origins of Psychosurgery: Shaw, Burkhardt and Moniz 8 HIST.
OF PSYCHIATRY 61 (1997). For a vivid first person account by a lobotomized patient, see HOWARD
DUDDY, MY LOBOTOMY (2007).

82. In this case, of course, by becoming tractable, rather than by not producing defective
offspring. It is quite possible that someone who had been lobotomized might also have been
sterilized by joining inaccurate eugenics with inaccurate neurology, but I have not found any
such instance.
83.
FINGER, supra note 81, at 293-96; JOHNSON, supra note 81, at 106-31; PRESSMAN,
supra note 81, at 401-25.
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priori reason to assume that a previous interpretation is doctrinally
preferable to a newly developed one.8 4 As a general matter, therefore,
judges remain subject to normative assessment of their decisions,
despite the institutional limitations imposed by legal doctrine.
With these considerations in mind, the argument that judicial
review should focus explicitly and preeminently on human rights can
be assessed. The institutional context of the courts strongly supports
this argument. Accepting the validity of judicial review, which is a
matter of near-consensus in the United States generally, even among
legal academics, 8 5 it seems clear that explicit guarantees of rights are
a notable feature of the text that the judiciary is assigned to enforce.
Not only are such guarantees explicitly stated, in both the original
text and the amendments, but the language of these guarantees
strongly implies judicial enforcement. One need not accept the legal
process argument that the court should leave structural features of
the text to the political process, and limit itself to human rights on a
Footnote Four rationale,8 6 to perceive the textual support for human
84. It might appear that an originalist theory of interpretation would favor prior
interpretations over current ones, based on the idea that earlier interpreters are in closer contact
with the Framers. But originalists are often textualists as well, which leads them to the claim
that they can read the language more accurately than their predecessors. See, e.g., District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592-95 (2008) (reversing two hundred years of judicial
precedent based on the claim that a current interpreter was better able to discern the Framers'
original intent by reading the text). This parallels the distinction between the Protestant and
Catholic interpretation of Scripture.
85. A number of scholars have recently championed departmentalism, which argues that
other branches of government have equal authority to interpret the Constitution. See, e.g.,
SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 27-53 (1988); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 254-67 (2d ed. 2000); Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity
and PoliticalInstability, 84 VA. L. REV 83, 106 (1998); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegal, Equal
Protection by Law: FederalAntidiscriminationLegislation after Morrison and Kimmel, 110 YALE
L.J. 441, 513-22 (2000); Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial ConstitutionalInterpretation:Three
Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 845-51 (2002). Others have argued for different
versions of popular constitutionalism, which grants the populace an influential or decisive role in
the interpretive process. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE THE PEOPLE RULE": A CONSTITUTIONAL
POPULIST MANIFESTO (1994); Robin West, Katrina, the Constitution and the Legal Question
Doctrine, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1127 (2006). Although these approaches would certainly change
the authoritative nature of Supreme Court decisions, neither is particularly relevant to the issue
under discussion. As long as the Court has some role in constitutional review of legislation, it
should make the right decision rather than the wrong one, regardless of whether that decision is
final or contingent.
86. For statements of this position, see generally JESSE C. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT (1980); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1981); Bruce LaPierre, PoliticalAccountability and the National Political Process-An
Alternative to Judicial Review, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 577 (1985); Bruce La Pierre, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the
Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779, 808 (1982); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
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rights enforcement. Most of the rights provisions, including
guarantees of free speech, free exercise, non-establishment, due
process and equal protection, and prohibitions of ex post facto laws,
bills of attainder, self-incrimination and slavery are stated as limits on
the legislature, that is, on the government's dominant policy maker. It
seems natural, given the Anglo-American legal tradition, that such
limits would be imposed by a court. Federalist provisions, such as the
Tenth Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment, and the prohibition
against sub-dividing states, can claim judicial enforcement on the
same grounds. Other structural provisions, however, are stated as
grants of authority to a particular decision maker, or general design
features, without any implication that these provisions will be
enforced by an external institution.
A second reason to ascribe enforcement of human rights to the
Supreme Court's institutional role is the protections that the
Constitution provides for the Justices: life tenure and salary
protection8 7 as well as the independence from any other decision
maker that judges are understood to possess in the Anglo-American
tradition. These elaborate provisions seem more necessary if the Court
is expected to place limits on the government in its entirety, as
opposed to deciding against one political institution but in favor of
another. In other words, the structure of the Supreme Court and other
federal courts suggests that these courts are intended to protect the
powerless individual against the force of government, or the tyranny
of the majority.
On the basis of this institutional context, Buck v. Bell once
again appears as a bad decision, a basic failure by the Court. The
vulnerability of those subjected to compulsory sterilization could not
have been more apparent.8 8 Their weakness was the explicit basis for
the deprivation that was imposed on them.8 9 The rationale for this
deprivation was not their own benefit, but the benefit of the society
that was declared to have become weary of their presence. Moreover,
the deprivation itself was severe; the Justices need only have been
human beings to understand the value that most people attached to
Federalism:The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government,
54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
87. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
88. The Virginia sterilization law at issue in the case had the effect of permitting
sterilization of those committed to state hospitals as feeble-minded or epileptic, a notably
powerless group of people. LOMBARDO, supra note 15, at 92; see also Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,
205-07 (1927). Carrie Buck herself, a test case for the law, had been thrown out of her foster
home when she became pregnant. See BLACK, supra note 15, at 108-17; LOMBARDO, supra note
15, at 103-35. The evocative title of Black's book is War Against the Weak.
89. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
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having children. While this may not have been clearly identified as a
legal right at the time of the decision, the idea of the family and the
home as a private realm, exempt from government control, was well
established in the legal tradition. In short, the Justices should have
known that their institutional role involved the protection of
vulnerable individuals from government intervention that imposed
severe burdens on them in the name of public benefit.
Moreover, the Justices should have been cognizant of the effect
that their decision would produce as a result of the Supreme Court's
role as the nation's highest court and a purported guardian of human
rights. The decision in Buck v. Bell was widely regarded as a
normative imprimatur for compelled sterilization. It dispelled the
doubts that had been widespread at the time about the legality and
acceptability of the procedure. As Edwin Black reports: "Once Holmes'
ruling was handed down, it was cited everywhere as the law of the
land. New laws were enacted, bringing the total number of states
sanctioning sterilization to twenty-nine. Old laws were revised and
replaced." 90 As a result, the number of compelled sterilizations
increased and remained at that higher level for the next thirteen
years. 91 In other words, the Court's role enabled it to influence public
opinion beyond the legal effect of its decision. This predictable
intrusion on the lives of vulnerable individuals should have provided
the Court with an additional basis for reaching a different result in
Buck v. Bell.
B. DistinguishingPropertyRights
The Supreme Court's pragmatic context has a temporal as well
as a structural aspect; that is, in addition to the position of the Court
in our governmental system, as just discussed, we must also consider
the status of the Court at the particular time when the decision in
question was being made. Buck v. Bell was decided in the midst of
what has subsequently been called the Lochner Era. In considering
people's decisions in context, it is important to avoid imposing current
periodization on those who were not thinking in those terms; no one in

90. BLACK, supra note 15, at 122; see also LARGENT, supra note 15, at 114; LOMBARDO,
supra note 15, at 185-98; NOURSE, supranote 15, at 31.
91. BLACK, supra note 15, at 122-23. States such as Utah, South Dakota, and Minnesota,
which had not performed any compelled sterilizations before the decisions, performed 252, 577,
and 1,880, respectively, during the thirteen years that followed. Of the 35,878 compelled
sterilizations between 1907 and 1940, almost 30,000 were performed after the decision. This
trend was brought to a close by the Court's decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942),
which is discussed below.
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the Middle Ages thought of themselves as living in the Middle Ages,
92
and the term Renaissance was invented in the nineteenth century.
But the term "Lochner Court" refers to a reality that was well
understood at the time. During the three decades prior to Buck v. Bell,
the Supreme Court struck down state and federal statutes regulating
economic activity on the basis of a newly articulated constitutional
right, which it identified as liberty of contract. 93 Because this
legislation was the product of a broad-based social movement well
recognized at the time, the Court's decisions were extremely
controversial. Many people, in both the legal academy and the wider
society, condemned the Court as exceeding its authority or
misinterpreting the Constitution. 94 This controversy would come to an
end exactly one decade after Buck v. Bell, with the demise of liberty of
contract as a constitutional doctrine. 95 But no one knew that at the
time, of course, and the decision must thus be understood in the
context of that raging debate about the Supreme Court's proper role.
The standard account of the Court's liberty of contract
decisions is that they represent an unprincipled effort by a politically
conservative court to impede progressive legislation. 96 In recent years,
however, scholars have challenged this interpretation, based on the
fact that the Court was actually making careful distinctions and
upheld a good deal of regulatory legislation. 97 David Bernstein argues
92.

See generally JACOB BuRCKHARDT, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE RENAISSANCE IN ITALY

(Samuel George Chetwynd Middlemore trans., Modern Library 2002) (1860) (memorializing the
term "renaissance" two years after it was coined by French historian Jules Michelet in 1858).
93. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 46 (1905) (maximum hours law); Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161, 168-69 (1908) (federal law prohibiting employers from forbidding
union members among employees); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1915) (state law
prohibiting employers from forbidding union members among employees); Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 539 (1923) (minimum wage law); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 271 (1932) (law requiring certification before entering business).
94.
See PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V.
NEW YORK 128-37 (1990); PAUL L. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES: 1918-1969, at

68-82, 99-115 (1972).
95. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 381, 400 (1937) (upholding minimum wage
law); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 5 (1937) (upholding Wagner Act
regulation of employee relations through unions); United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144,
145-46, 154 (1938) (upholding consumer protection law forbidding sale of milk mixed with
vegetable oil).
96. CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 179-80, 230-31
(Russell 1958) (1930); ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 513-23 (1948); BENJAMIN TWISS, LAWYERS AND
THE CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ-FAIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (1942); Thomas Reed

Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum Wage Legislation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 545, 571-72 (1924);
Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 876-883 (1987).
97. See generally Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning laws); Bunting
v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (maximum hours laws in manufacturing enterprises); Hipolite
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that liberty of contract was a well-recognized element of nineteenth
century legal thought derived from natural rights beliefs; 98 David
Mayer argues that it emerged from the Founders' understanding of
the liberty for which they had fought, and on which they based the
nation they created; 99 and Howard Gilman regards it as reflecting a
long-standing American aversion to class legislation, a demand that
government act neutrally and for the common good. 100 Barry Cushman
offers the related argument that many cases decided by the Lochner
Court laid the groundwork for the subsequent rejection of liberty of
contract doctrine, 10 1 while Noga Morag-Levine notes that the Court
was strongly motivated by a desire to preserve common law
doctrine. 102
One difficulty with the revisionist effort to rehabilitate liberty
of contract doctrine is that it fails to account for the Lochner Era
Court's reliance on a uniquely narrow reading of the Commerce
Clause to strike down economic legislation enacted by the federal
government. 103 These doctrinally unrelated decisions suggest that the
Court had broader and more political motivations than the revisionists
suggest. 104 What truly motivated the Court, in my view, was a desire
to protect the right to private property, including the opportunity to
acquire property, against legislation that was seen as undermining
it. 105 This enterprise dominated the Court's decisions, and its
thinking, at the time that the constitutional challenge to compulsory
sterilization was presented.
Protection of private property and the constitutionality of
compulsory sterilization are not directly related to one another. That
Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (the federal Pure Food and Drug Act); Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (maximum hours laws for women).
98. BERNSTEIN, supranote 51.
99. MAYER, supra note 51.
100. GILLMAN, supranote 51.
101. CUSHMAN, supra note 12.

102. MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 51, at 63-85; see also KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM:
LABOR, THE LAW, AND THE LIBERAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1992) (noting the

influence of common law on American political and legal thought).
103. E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 282-84 (1936) (maximum hours for coal
miners); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1936) (agricultural price supports); R.R. Ret.
Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 344 (1935) (pension system for railroad workers); Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 280 (1918) (prohibition of goods produced with child labor); see also
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1895) (restrictive reading of the Sherman
Antitrust Act on Commerce Clause grounds).
104. This does not apply to Cushman, who discusses the Commerce Clause at length, but
neither he nor Morag-Levine is attempting to rehabilitate liberty of contract doctrine. See
generally CUSHMAN, supra note 12; MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 51.
105. Edward L. Rubin, Lochner and Property, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM THE INSIDE

OUT: A TRIBUTE TO THE WORK OF JERRY MASHAW (Nicholas Parrillo ed., forthcoming 2016).
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is, there is no particular reason why a court that was intent on
protecting property rights should have been unwilling to strike down
laws that mutilated people's bodies and denied them the opportunity
to have children on the basis of a questionable scientific theory. But it
is also not difficult to perceive that the controversy over economic
rights that the Supreme Court had created for itself affected its
judgment about the sterilization issue. When confronted with a
challenge to democratically-enacted legislation, the Court's first
instinct was to ask if this legislation trenched upon the property rights
it was attempting to protect. If not, it tended to view the legislation as
unobjectionable.
This tendency is most apparent in the Lochner Court's
insensitivity to free speech issues. The controversy about American
entry into World War I, followed by the Communist takeover of Russia
and the increase in political radicalism within the United States,
sparked a series of statutes aimed at suppressing political speech.
These statutes were clearly seen at the time as constitutionally
suspect, and convictions under them were challenged on that
ground. 10 6 But the Supreme Court rejected all these challenges and
upheld the statutes. 10 7 As Geoffrey Stone has pointed out, 08 these
decisions follow the pattern that has prevailed until very recent times:
the Supreme Court has always succumbed to the political pressures of
wartime and hardly ever enforced the First Amendment against
government suppression of speech during those times. In many ways,
this consistent pattern is the strongest evidence for Chemerinsky's
''case against the Supreme Court."
The Court's failure to enforce the First Amendment may be
ascribed to political timidity, and the absence of other human rights
decisions may be seen as a result of the conceptual context, that is, the
undeveloped state of doctrine in this area. But it is the decisions
where the Court did strike down legislation on grounds that we
associate with human rights that reveals the extent to which the
Lochner Court was transfixed, or obsessed, by its concern for private
property. In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court struck down a nativist
106. GEOFFREY STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME:
ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 135-233 (2004).

FROM THE SEDITION

107. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 363-72 (1927) (upholding a state law
criminalizing the Communist Party as disturbing public peace); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 664-65 (1925) (acknowledging that the Fourteenth Amendment had made the First
Amendment applicable to the states, but upholding a state law criminalizing political speech);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 616-17 (1919) (upholding a conviction under the federal
Sedition Act of 1918 for distributing leaflets); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48-50 (1919)
(upholding a conviction under the Federal Espionage Act of 1917 for distributing leaflets).
108. STONE, supra note 106.
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statute that forbid teaching school children in a foreign language and
forbid any foreign language instruction to children younger than high
school age.10 9 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, it struck down a Ku Klux
Klan inspired statute that forbid attendance at private schools below
the high school level. 110 Both decisions, which relied on substantive
due process, have been seen as harbingers of the Court's subsequent
human rights jurisprudence. Perhaps they were, but the Court's
rationale in both cases rested on a defense of private property and
economic opportunity. The Meyer case was brought by a German
teacher. In the decision, Justice McReynolds (one of the Four
Horsemen) 1 wrote that: "Plaintiff in error taught [German] in school
as part of his occupation. His right thus to teach and the right of the
parent to engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are
within the liberty of the Amendment."1 1 2 Pierce was brought to court
by owners of private schools. Justice McReynolds, again writing for
the Court, declared that the owners "have business and property for
which they claim protection. These are threatened with destruction
through the unwarranted compulsion which [the state] is exercising
over present and prospective patrons of their school."11 3 And he added,
with some self-awareness and considerable accuracy, that "this court
114
has gone very far to protect against loss threatened by such action."
The people who were subject to compulsory sterilization were
neither language teachers nor private school owners. They appeared
before the Court as impecunious and disadvantaged, indeed, as
metaphorically naked, since what they had put at issue was the
integrity of their genitals. The Court's failure to respond to their
challenge can be seen as a direct result of its concern with private
property rights. The institutional context was that the Court at this
time saw itself as the defender of these rights, and was essentially
unwilling to enforce any other types of rights against democratically
enacted legislation.
Given the institutional context of the Justices at the time of
Buck v. Bell, to what extent can that decision be condemned? The
answer is: to a very great extent. Indeed, the institutional context
itself is a primary ground for such condemnation. The answer to the
109. 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
110. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
111. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
112. Meyer, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
113. Pierce, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
114. Id. There is a good deal of fine language about liberty in both decisions, and this
language would provide support for future decisions that supported human rights. But, the
grounds of both decisions rest on economic rights.
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revisionists' attempt to rehabilitate the economic liberty decisions of
the Lochner Court is that these decisions were clearly wrong at the
time. They were premised on the idea that the Constitution
establishes a substantive right to private property, independent of the
procedural right to avoid confiscation of such property, once granted,
without due process or just compensation. Alternatively, the decisions
were premised on the idea that the common law has constitutional
significance and cannot be altered by legislation, unless some sort of
amplified justification is provided.
This doctrine, in either version, is based on what we now
regard as a misunderstanding of the federal judiciary's institutional
role. There is no textual or doctrinal support for a substantive right of
private property or a presumptive rule against changing common
law. 115 The contours of property are a matter for the political process
to determine, and have been throughout the entirety of AngloAmerican legal history. Some political theorists have argued in favor
of substantive property rights, 116 but there is no reason to assume that
the Constitution enacts Mr. John Locke's social contract theory. The
Supreme Court strongly endorsed the view that property is governed
by majoritarian decision just ten years after Buck v. Bell, 117 and has
maintained it ever since. 118 It clarified the implications of this position

115. The original Constitution uses the word property only once. Article IV, Section 3,
Clause 2 states: "The Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." The
term "property" does appear in the Fifth Amendment, and states that no person shall "be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation," and the Fourteenth Amendment applies the
first phrase to the states. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV. But this language does not grant a right to
private property; rather it grants a right to due process. It says that the state can take property
away from an individual if it compensates the individual, and may take an individual's property
away with compensation on a showing that the individual fits into a generally established
legislative category that justifies such treatment (a tax, a fine for misbehavior, a restriction on
property use, etc.). This does not impose limits on the sort of legislation the state can enact, as
the Court recognized in 1937.
116. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALIsM AND FREEDOM 22-26 (1962); G.W.F. HEGEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 122-34 (T.M. Knox trans., 1967); John Locke, The Second Treatise: An
Essay Concerning the True Original,Extent, and End of Civil Government, in JOHN LOCKE, TwO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 100, 111-21 (Ian Shapiro
ed., 2003); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 169-82 (1974). See generally ALAN
RYAN, PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY (1986); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1988).
117. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-54 (1938) (upholding a law
outlawing the sale of milk mixed with vegetable oil under rational basis review); West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398-400 (1937) (ruling that the legislature may pass minimum
wage laws since those laws do not impede the right to contract).
118. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1976) (noting that
legislative acts regulating economic life are presumptively Constitutional and will be upheld if
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cases, declaring that "[p]roperty
by the Constitution. Rather, they
are defined by existing rules or
independent source such as state

law."119

But even if we are willing to accept the revisionist position and
argue that the Lochner Court's doctrine was more justifiable at the
time it was articulated, there is certainly no justification for allowing
that effort to preclude protection of other human rights. The two
claims are doctrinally unrelated. Protecting the rights of an employer
to pay his workers lower wages, or demand that they work longer
hours, and then ignoring the claims of powerless and impoverished
individuals to avoid physical mutilation that will destroy their ability
to have children, is simply class-based bias. It is inexcusable today,
and it was inexcusable at the time. By 1927, after roughly half a
century of national concern over the conditions of the urban and rural
poor, the Court should have been conscious of the same injustice we
perceive at present.
A converse version of this assessment may explain the
somewhat surprising fact that Justice Holmes wrote the majority
opinion in Buck v. Bell. Holmes was, of course, the leading opponent of
the Court's liberty of contract or substantive due process doctrine. 120
His argument is the one nearly everyone accepts today; majoritarian
governments determine the contours of property rights through
legislation. Having taken this position, he seems to have generalized
it to the idea that the government has broad authority, subject to few
constitutional constraints. As is well known, he wrote the opinion for
the Court that upheld convictions under the Sedition Act of 1918,
coining another of his famous phrases in the process, 121 before he
recognized that such legislation violated his own commitment to free
there is a rational basis for that regulation); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 490-91
(1955) (upholding regulations of eye doctors under rational basis review).
119. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
120. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing
that liberty of contract is not found in the Fourteenth Amendment); Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161, 191 (1908) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I think that the right to make contracts at will
that has been derived from the word liberty in the amendments has been stretched to its extreme
by the decisions."); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (noting
the opposition to the rulings in Lochner and Adair); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525,
567-71 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (reemphasizing questions about liberty of contract in the
Constitution); see also G. EDWARD WHITE, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 92-93 (2d ed. 2006)
(noting that Holmes considered the idea that liberty of contract was in the Constitution a

"fiction').
121. "The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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speech. 122 He dissented from the decision in Meyer v. Nebraska,
declaring: "I think I appreciate the objection to the law, but it appears
to me to present a question upon which men reasonably might differ,
and therefore I am unable to say that the Constitution of the United
123
States prevents the experiment being tried."'
The normative condemnation of Holmes for his position is
parallel to the condemnation of the Court's majority. Both failed to
make the sorts of distinctions that moral actors, and also, in this case,
legal professionals are expected to comprehend. The majority was so
concerned about its perceived right of private property that it seemed
to lack the motivation to consider any other rights. Holmes was so
intent on opposing the majority's invalidation of state law on property
rights grounds that his ability to discern constitutional problems with
other types of laws was seriously weakened. This is exactly the sort of
conceptual slovenliness that merits condemnation by subsequent
observers.
C. Protectingthe Court
A third element of pragmatic contextualization involves the
structural position of the institution itself, rather than the substantive
policies or doctrines that derive from the institution's design. It is
natural for someone who is placed within an institution, particularly
in a leadership position, to defend the status of the institution. This
instinct, moreover, will generally be justifiable upon reflection; the
individual can readily argue that protection of the institution is an
essential aspect of his or her position. In other words, when people
function as members of an institution, rather than as members of
society in general, their institutional role serves as a pragmatic factor
that influences, and sometimes determines, their decisions. This does
not preclude a global condemnation of the institution, from the
perspective of either an external observer or a member of the society.
But in the absence of such a condemnation, it would seem to alter the
normative judgments that we are willing to impose upon an individual
who functions in an institutional setting.
The question is directly relevant to Chemerinsky's book. Some
scholars challenge the validity of judicial review in its entirety, most

122. See THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: How HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND - AND
CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 96-100 (1st ed. 2013) (describing Holmes's
views on free speech).
123. Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923) (companion case to Meyer).
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typically because it is counter-majoritarian. 12 4 But Chemerinsky offers
no such criticism; his "case against the Supreme Court" is based on
the content of its particular decisions. In effect, he argues inductively
rather than deductively; what is wrong with the Supreme Court as an
institution, specifically an institution authorized to reverse
democratically enacted legislation on constitutional grounds, is that
the Court has regularly reached bad decisions in particular cases. The
force of this approach lies in its sincerity. Generalized attacks on the
institution of judicial review often seem to be motivated by
dissatisfaction with the Court's substantive positions. More
specifically, it was political conservatives who tended to condemn
judicial review during the Warren Court era, and political
progressives who have voiced such condemnation as the Court moved
to the right during the Rehnquist and Roberts eras. This natural
tendency provides a reason to abjure such global condemnations and
formulate normative judgments of institutions, and institutional
behavior, on the basis of the institution's actual performance.
Assuming we adopt this perspective, does the understandable
and justifiable inclination to defend one's institution provide at least a
partial justification for the Court's decision in Buck v. Bell? At first
glance, this might appear to be a reasonable argument. The Court had
certainly been subjected to extensive criticism for its decisions striking
down Progressive legislation. Its Justices may well have concluded
that they should not expose their institution to additional stress, that
it would be better to ignore constitutional problems in other areas.
Such concern for the Supreme Court's overall legitimacy was strongly
125
championed by Alexander Bickel in his idea of the "passive virtues."

124. The phrase was coined, and made famous, by Alexander M. Bickel. See ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d

ed. 1986). But the concern goes back much further. Barry Friedman has explored its influence on
American constitutional law. See generally Barry Friedman, The History of the
CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
333 (1998) (detailing the development of judicial review and supremacy); Barry Friedman, The
History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part II: Reconstruction'sPolitical Court, 91 GEO.
L.J. 1 (2002) (discussing judicial review during Reconstruction); Barry Friedman, The History of
the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383
(2001) (discussing judicial review in the Lochner era); Barry Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV, 971 (2000)
(examining the Court during the New Deal); Barry Friedman, The Birth of An Academic
Obsession: The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153
(2002). For further discussion regarding Bickel's work and its lasting significance, see generally
THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN

DIFFICULTY, AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Kenneth D. Ward & Cecelia Castillo
eds., 2005).
125. See BICKEL, supra note 124, at 111.
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It can be seen as preserving the Court's ability to reach desirable
results in future cases.
A general difficulty with taking institutional considerations of
this sort into account is that they are second order arguments. The
decision maker, instead of doing what she perceives to be right, makes
strategic judgments about the broader effects of her decision.
Similarly, the observer, in judging her actions, tends to justify them
on the basis of judgments that he knows she made, or that he
interposes on the basis of his own sense of the situation. Because such
effects are difficult to assess, however, these judgments often become
vehicles for normative failure; both the decision maker's action and
the observer's assessment reflect an unwillingness to make hard
choices or suppress extraneous beliefs.
That would seem to be the case with any institutional
protection justification for Buck v. Bell. The opposite decision would
certainly have antagonized the proponents of eugenics, some of whom
were truly messianic about the subject, but they were largely a narrow
elite group, not a broad-based social movement. Moreover, as
discussed above, the forces that opposed them were at least as
influential, so that the Court was in its typical stance of choosing
between the two sides of a political debate, rather than opposing an
overwhelming majority. More generally, there is good reason to doubt
that the Supreme Court's status is as fragile as the idea of
institutional protection necessarily assumes. The Justices who decided
Buck v. Bell could not have known that the Court would weather
rather easily a frontal assault from an enormously popular President,
commanding large majorities in both Houses of Congress, some ten
years later. 126 But they did know that they had struck down a great
deal of state and federal legislation without generating any serious
threat to the Court itself, and they were clearly willing to continue
doing so. They knew, moreover, that the Court had survived decisions
in the past that created massive controversy, and that they
themselves must have viewed as mistaken, such as Dred Scott v.
127
Sanford.
A further normative problem with Buck v. Bell involves the
impact of the decision. Bickel's passive virtues are designed to protect
126. See CONRAD BLACK, FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT: CHAMPION OF LIBERTY 404-19 (1st

ed. 2003); CUSHMAN, supra note

12, at 11-32; WiLLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG,

FRANKLIN

ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 231-38 (1st ed. 1963); JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT:

THE LION AND THE FOX 293-316 (1st ed. 1956), Cushman effectively refutes the view that Justice
Owen Roberts was intimidated into switching his position by Roosevelt's initiative.
127. 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (invalidating the Missouri Compromise by declaring that slaves
could not become citizens).
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the Court's legitimacy by enabling it to avoid making decisions. In the
familiar phrase, he wants the Court to punt in certain circumstances.
The Court could certainly have done so in Buck v. Bell; there was no
insistent reason why it needed to take the case or decide it on
anything but the narrowest grounds. Instead, it issued a ringing
endorsement of compelled sterilization, and thereby directly affected
the frequency with which the procedure was used. If this was an effort
to preserve the Court's legitimacy, then it did so by sacrificing the
rights, and the bodies, of innocent people in the interest of a powerful
institution or its privileged members. That is perhaps the
paradigmatic case of immoral behavior.
III. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTUALIZATION

There is, however, a third normative ground on which the
Supreme Court can be judged. It involves the basic reason why we
might want to engage in the enterprise of assessing decisions made by
people who are dead. We might do so for own edification; by reflecting
on moral judgments made by people in the past, we might gain insight
into ideas about right and wrong that can guide our own behavior. But
another, more concrete reason for this exercise arises when the
decision makers are members of an institution that continues to exist,
and whose decisions affect the present. In other words, institutions
can long outlast the lives of their members, thus projecting the actions
of long-dead individuals into the realities of contemporary life. This is
clearly the case with the Supreme Court, and the reason to be
concerned about a bad decision issued by Justice Holmes and his
colleagues.
The consequence of this consideration can be described as
institutional contextualization. Not only should we place an
individual's action in the conceptual context of its time, and in the
pragmatic context that he or she confronted, but we should also
consider the performance of the institution to which the individual
belonged over an extended period of time. This broader approach can
be understood from two perspectives, the one normative and the other
functional. As a normative matter, we may want to judge institutions
on a broader temporal basis because they act on such a basis. It is
possible to apply this approach to individuals as well, to forgive their
mistakes if they recant their views or compensate for their actions.
But we might also want to ignore such subsequent reversals as
insincere or ineffectual. With institutions, subsequent action is more
intrinsic to any given decision. Because the institution outlasts its
members and generally continues to occupy a similar role in society at
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each time, reversals cannot usually be judged by the same standards
of insincerity or insignificance. If Jefferson quietly regretted his
slaveholding practices at the end of his life, 128 we could say that he
nonetheless enjoyed its illegitimate benefits for the majority of his
existence and that his quiet regrets at the end of it count for little. But
the fact that the United States, which inherited slavery from its
colonial predecessor and tolerated it for many years, ultimately fought
a war to abolish it and then declared it illegal is an essential
consideration in our normative judgment because the nation's
existence is continuous.
Similarly, the subsequent actions of an institution matter from
a functional perspective because of the institution's continuing role.
Individuals often exercise influence during discrete periods of their
lives. Jefferson created a great deal of economic dislocation through
the Embargo Act of 1807;129 a year later he was out of office, and
while he would enjoy a great deal of respect and lionization thereafter,
he would no longer wield any significant influence on public policy.
Thus, there was no practical way for him to undo the damage he had
caused, or compensate for it by taking action in another area. But
institutions, as long as they continue to exist, retain exactly this
capacity.
This institutional contextualization does not change the
assessment of Buck v. Bell; it remains a dreadful decision, meriting
condemnation even when considered in its conceptual and pragmatic
context. But the force of this condemnation lies in our assessment of
the Supreme Court as an ongoing institution-a factor in our own
lives-and here the Court's subsequent performance becomes
relevant.
Within a decade and a half, the Court reversed its position on
compelled sterilization. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,1 0 it struck down a
statute authorizing the sterilization of those convicted of three
successive felonies, using a rationale that undermined the

128. See 1 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 68 (Paul Leicester
Ford ed., 1892) ("Nothing is more certainly written in the book of fate than that these people are
to be free."); see also JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 314-26 (1998) (pointing out that Jefferson wrote these words to justify himself for
posterity).
129. See ELLIS, supra note 128, at 283-84 (describing Jefferson's second term as
"disastrous"); JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 91-118 (2012) (describing the Act as
"regulatory hubris"); SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO
LINCOLN 131-34 (2005).

130. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). For a comprehensive and vivid account of the case, see NOURSE,
supra note 15.
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constitutional validity of all such statutes. It held that the statute
violated the equal protection clause because it applied only to certain
categories of offenders, and not to others. Writing for the Court,
Justice Douglas noted that if a stranger steals $20 "and repeats his
act and is convicted three times, he may be sterilized. But [a clerk who
embezzles from his employer] is not subject to the pains and penalties
of the Act no matter how large his embezzlements nor how frequent
131
his convictions."
This did not quite overrule Buck v. Bell, of course, and it is not
the way that we would decide the case today. As Victoria Nourse
points out, 132 it relies on a type of equal protection argument that had
been used to strike down economic legislation during the Lochner Era,
and was implicitly rejected in United States v. Carolene Products13 3 in
favor of a test that depends on the existence of a suspect
classification.1 3 4 But the Court at least gestured at three factors that
were prominent in the societal attack on eugenics-based sterilization
and that rendered the statute vulnerable on the basis of its
distinctions. First, it noted that the scientific support for the
underlying premise that criminal propensities could be inherited was
questionable. Second, it implied that the distinctions might reflect
racial bias. Third, and most explicitly, the Court stated that "[t]here is
no redemption for the individual whom the law touches. Any
experiment which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is
forever deprived of a basic liberty." 13 5 These collateral considerations
rendered the opinion consonant with emerging social norms, even
though the Court was unwilling to use these norms directly to decide
the case. They also signaled that other compulsory sterilization
statutes were likely to be struck down, no matter how inclusive their
scope of application.
Today, it is simply inconceivable that the Supreme Court would
uphold any compulsory sterilization statute. In the Court's defense,
therefore, it can be said that its decisions tend to move in the same
131. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 539.
132. See NOURSE, supra note 15, at 145-72.
133. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The Court reasoned, as we do today, that the Fourteenth
Amendment "does not compel their legislatures to prohibit all like evils, or none. A legislature
may hit at an abuse which it has found, even though it has failed to strike at another." Id. at 151.
134. See id. at 152 n.4 (noting that review more stringent than rational basis review may
apply in different cases). The outdated character of the Court's rationale is indicated by the fact
that current laws increasing the acceptable punishment of incarceration for three-time offenders,
now described with questionable levity as "three strikes and you're out," have been upheld by
courts. Thus Oklahoma's three strikes and they're off law seems to have been troublesome on
different grounds.
135. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
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direction as social morality. To make this judgment, it is necessary to
distinguish between social morality and legal specificity. Moral
principles are generated by civil society and can only reach a certain
distance into the provisions of any specialized field, whether
engineering, medicine, or law. Beyond that point, technical knowledge
will render the development of practices within the field relatively
insulated from civil society and subject to the more fine-grained
variations that are discernable only to those trained in that field.
These variations may well be based on the moral inclinations of the
decision makers who possess that specialized training, and those
inclinations will certainly connect with social morality, but they will
not be controlled by social morality. The result is that, within this
insulated area of specialization, implementation of the general social
principles will be subject to relatively small-scale variation. These
will seem significant to those within the field-and may indeed be
significant within that delimited compass-but they will not alter the
extent to which an institution can be said to reflect the more general
social morality.
This interplay of social morality and technical or specialist
adjustment is well illustrated by the decisions of the Supreme Court
during the past sixty years or so, from the appointment of Earl
Warren as Chief Justice until the present day. During the Warren
Era, the Court handed down a series of ground-breaking decisions
involving
racial
equality, 136
sexual
autonomy, 137
electoral
39
13
8
police practices,1 and the rights of the accused. 140
representation,
After Warren retired, the Court's progressive wing continued to
prevail for several years, and there were a number of additional
decisions of this magnitude involving free speech,' 4 ' administrative
procedure, 142 family planning 143, and the death penalty. 144 In doing so,
136. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (striking down racial segregation in
public schools).
137. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (striking down prohibitions
against the distribution of contraceptives to married couples).
138. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (declaring state election apportionment
issues justiciable); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579-81 (1964) (striking down unequal state
election apportionment).
139. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (requiring specified warnings
before police interrogations).
140. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (requiring state-appointed
counsel for indigents in criminal cases).
141. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (striking down punishment of
speech under criminal syndicalism statutes).
142. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (declaring that government benefits
require the same type of procedural protections as common law property rights).
143. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973) (striking down legal prohibition of abortion).
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it placed itself at the advancing edge of the emerging social morality
on each of these issues. Chemerinsky is certainly correct in arguing
that leadership of this sort represented an unusual period in the
Court's history. Since the mid-1970s, the Court has generally not
assumed this role. But it also has not reversed any of the Warren
Court's major initiatives, with the possible exception of the death
penalty decision. 145 Instead, it has modified these decisions, making
the sorts of technical adjustments that are accessible to technical or
specialized knowledge and insulated from more general social
morality. 146
In other words, the Supreme Court has not reversed the
general trend of its decisions in the direction of evolving social
morality, even though it is no longer exercising the moral leadership
of the Warren Court era. A notable example from recent decades,
parallel in many ways to the compelled sterilization decisions,
involves gay and lesbian rights. When first presented with the issue,
the Court upheld a Georgia sodomy law criminalizing homosexual
activity between consenting adults. 147 This failed to reflect social
morality, which was clearly moving away from the traditional idea
that sex is only acceptable when used as an instrument for
procreation, and toward recognition of its role in human selffulfillment. 148 The Court's language was as harsh as Holmes's three
generations of imbeciles; Justice White, writing for the majority, said
that "respondent would have us announce.., a fundamental right to

144. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (invalidating existing death
penalty statutes).
145. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976). Gregg does not overrule Furman; it
merely refuses to move in the same direction. Furman declared existing state capital
punishment statutes unconstitutional on the basis of their arbitrary application to particular
offenses. Many states then amended their statutes. Anti-death penalty forces were hoping that
these statutes would be struck down on similar or other grounds, but the Court in Gregg found
no constitutional defects with the new statutes. Leadership for abolition of the death penalty
then passed into civil society, and has led to a substantial reduction in the number of executions,
although not to the elimination of the sanction.
146. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubilerer, 541 U.S. 267, 305-06 (2004) (declaring partisan
gerrymandering non-justiciable); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-79 (1992)
(replacing Roe v. Wade's trimester rule with an undue burden test, but preserving the
constitutional right to an abortion); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657-59 (1984) (allowing
admission of evidence obtained without Miranda warnings in emergency situations); Matthews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347-49 (1976) (imposing cost-benefit analysis on due process rights in
administrative cases); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745-52 (1974) (precluding inter-district
busing as a remedy for school segregation without proof of a direct effect of one district on
another).
147. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986) (ruling that the Constitution does
not protect those who engage in homosexual acts).
148. See RUBIN, supra note 49, at 205-12 (discussing the morality of intimate relationships).
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engage in homosexual sodomy. This we are quite unwilling to do." 149
Chief Justice Burger concurred for the specific purpose of being still
more retrograde, quoting laws from non-democratic regimes that
ranged from two hundred to two thousand years old to support the
position that "there is no such thing as a fundamental right to commit
homosexual sodomy." 150
But this decision lasted only one year longer than Buck v. Bell,
and this time, the Court definitively overruled its earlier action.
Writing for the majority in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Kennedy noted
that attitudes toward homosexuality, whatever they were in the
distant past, were changing rapidly, and that "[t]his emerging
recognition should have been apparent when Bowers was decided...
Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct
today. It ... should be and now is overruled." 151 A decade later, in
Obergefell v. Hodges,152 the Court struck down the exclusion of same
sex couples from state marriage laws in ringing tones that invoked
both due process and equal protection. By the time it reached this
decision, about two-thirds of the states had already changed their
marriage laws, either by statute or judicial decision. Thus, the Court
was riding the crest of a change in social morality, rather than placing
itself at the advancing edge of this development.
How should we evaluate this performance? If we place the
Court's decisions in an institutional context, it would appear that
Buck v. Bell, like Bowers v. Hardwick, is not as reprehensible as it
would be when judged by our present standards, or even when judged
solely in its conceptual and pragmatic context. The Court's subsequent
and relatively rapid reversal of the decision should be taken into
account. 153 To be sure, people were denied rights that we now regard
as important, and that the Court subsequently recognized as such,
during the years that intervened between those decisions and their
reversal. But institutions, unlike individuals, are ongoing entities that
often exist over long periods and remain equally influential for the
duration. Thus, their performance can be viewed as spreading out over
a longer period, like viewing an object through a differently shaped
lens.
149. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
150. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
151. 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
152. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015) (holding that same-sex couples have a fundamental
right to marriage).
153. As opposed to the decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which was
reversed only some fifty-eight years later. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954)
(desegregating public schools).
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The Supreme Court might still be faulted for failing to position
itself at the advancing edge of an evolving social change. Gerald
Rosenberg describes our expectation for it to do so as a "hollow
hope," 154 and Chemerinsky certainly agrees with him. But from an
institutional perspective, that may be too much to ask. American
government is made of separate and distinctive components. At
different times, different institutions will take a leading role; that is to
be expected. Condemnation is merited when one institution acts as a
determined and sustained impediment to the process of evolving social
norms, as the Supreme Court did during the Lochner Era. When an
institution fails to lead, but follows willingly or reluctantly, the
preferable reaction may be mere disappointment.
CONCLUSION

Erwin Chemerinsky's case against the Supreme Court is not
based on the usual sort of constitutional law arguments, such as the
claim that the Court has failed to interpret the original text faithfully
or that it had failed to adapt the original text to changing
circumstances. Instead, it relies on a substantive political view: the
validity of the progressive agenda to establish and expand human
rights. This may not be easy to justify as a matter of theory, but
constitutional law is not a matter of theory. It is a statement of our
own society's norms and commitments. How many people in our
society would deny it? Who would defend the Court's position in Dred
Scott v. Sandford 55 or Plessy v. Ferguson 56? Who would defend its
refusal to protect freedom of speech whenever the nation was at war?
Who would defend the decision in Buck v. Bell?
As a matter of theory, it is possible to suspend moral judgment
regarding the decisions of past actors by placing these decisions in
their conceptual or pragmatic context. What is the point, we might
ask, of condemning people who are long dead for failing to recognize
and accept our current views? And how realistic is it to ignore the
very real political, economic, and social pressures that were acting on
them when we do not ignore, and in fact often internalize, those very
same types of pressure when they impinge on us? Here again,
however, the answers change when the topic is constitutional law.
The Supreme Court is an institution that continues to exist, and to

154. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT

SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (discussing the court's role in social change).
155. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
156. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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affect our lives, in the present day. Its proper role is a subject of
current debate.
If its members regularly made incorrect -and
immoral-decisions from our present perspective, then the value of
the institution itself is called into question. It would be unrealistic to
ignore the conceptual and pragmatic context of these decisions
entirely, but it seems appropriate to expect that the Court would
reflect and advance the beliefs we value once that context is taken into
account. If its history consists of decisions that we now regard as
outrageous and despicable, then the case against the Supreme Court
is powerful indeed.
That same institutional context, however, serves to modify our
sense of condemnation when we appropriately consider the Supreme
Court's past performance from our current perspective. It is true that
the Court has often reached indefensible positions. And it is also true
that the Court has failed to assume leadership on many important
issues that would seem to fall within its particular area of
responsibility. Nonetheless, it seems to correct itself over time. Sooner
or later -quite soon on the issue of same sex marriage, much too late
on the issue of racial segregation-the Court reaches results that we
currently approve. Occasionally it exercises leadership, and quite
often it adds moral force to the position that it ultimately reaches.
The Buck v. Bell decision exemplifies these considerations. We
currently regard compulsory sterilization with horror and perceive it
as a clear violation of human rights. Given the scientific support for
this practice during the early part of the twentieth century, the issue
was not as clear during the 1920s. But it was clear enough, given the
concurrent scientific doubts and the obvious intrusion on values that
were well recognized at the time, such as bodily integrity and family
autonomy. It was inexcusable that the Court failed to perceive those
values, that it was too immersed in a controversy of its own creation
about the constitutional status of property to focus on an obvious
human rights violation. The Court corrected its mistake in less than
two decades, however, reaching an opposite decision that we fully
approve today. In the interval, it validated an immoral practice, and
was partially responsible for a good deal of harm. But its opposite
decision brought an end to that practice and provided a moral
imprimatur for the forces in society that were rallying in support of
our current beliefs about human rights. That is a role that seems
worth preserving, despite all the Court's defects.
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